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Abstract: Digital ethics, also known as computer ethics or 
information ethics, is now a lively field that draws a lot of attention, 
but how did it come about and what were the developments that lead 
to its existence? What are the traditions, the concerns, the 
technological and social developments that pushed digital ethics? 
How did ethical issues change with digitalisation of human life? How 
did the traditional discipline of philosophy respond? The article 
provides an overview, proposing historical epochs: ‘pre-modernity’ 
prior to digital computation over data, via the ‘modernity’ of digital 
data processing to our present ‘post-modernity’ when not only the 
data is digital, but our lives themselves are largely digital. In each 
section, the situation in technology and society is sketched, and then 
the developments in digital ethics are explained. Finally, a brief 
outlook is provided. 
 
1. Introduction 
The history of digital ethics as a field followed the development and use of digital 
technologies in society, and it often mirrors the ethical concerns of the pre-digital 
technologies that were replaced – it is only fairly recently that digital technologies 
have posed questions that are truly new. When ‘data processing’ became a more 
common activity in industry and public administration in the 1960s, the concerns 
of ethicists were known issues like privacy, data security and power through 
information access. Today, digital ethics involves old issues that took on a new 
quality due to digital technology, such as surveillance, news, or dating; but it also 
covers new issues that did not exist at all, such as automated weapons, search 
engines, automated decision-making, and existential risk from AI.  
Müller, Vincent C. (forthcoming), 
‘History of digital ethics’, in Carissa 
Véliz (ed.), Oxford Handbook of 
Digital Ethics (Oxford: Oxford  
University Press). 
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The terms used to name the expanding discipline have also changed over time: We 
started with ‘computer ethics’ (Bynum 2001; Johnson 1985; Vacura 2015), then 
more abstract terms like ‘information ethics’ were proposed, and now some use a 
new term: ‘digital ethics’ (Capurro 2010), as this handbook does. We also have 
digital ethics for particular areas, such as ‘ethics of AI’, ‘data ethics’, ‘robot ethics’, 
etc.  
There are reasons for these changes: ‘computer ethics’ now sounds dated because 
it focuses attention on the machines, which made good sense when they were 
visible big boxes, but began to make less sense when many technical devices 
invisibly included computing. The more ambitious notion of ‘information ethics’ 
involves a digital ontology (Capurro 2006) and faces a significant challenge to 
explain the role of the notion of ‘information’; see (Floridi 1999) vs. (Floridi and 
Taddeo 2016). Also, the term ‘information ethics’ is sometimes considered in 
contexts in which information is not computed, e.g. in ‘library and information 
science’. Occasionally one hears ‘cyberethics’ (Spinello 2020), specifically dealing 
with the connected ‘cyberspace’ – probably now an outdated term, at least outside 
the military. In this confusion, some people use ‘digital’ as the new term, which 
captures most relevant phenomena and moves away from the machinery to their 
use – as does this handbook. One might argue that the process of ‘computing’ is 
still fundamental, but that we will probably soon care less whether a device uses 
computing (analogue or digital) – rather like we don’t care much which energy 
source the engine in a car uses. The notion of ‘data’ will continue to make sense, 
but in the future, I suspect that terms like ‘computing’ and ‘digital’ will just merge 
into ‘technology’. 
Given that this handbook has articles on the current state of the art, this article on 
the history of the field will not attempt to say much about the present. Instead, it 
tries to give a historical context to the current debates, both in debates during the 
early days of information technology (IT), from the 1940s to the 1970s, when IT 
was an expensive technology available only in well-funded central ‘computation 
centres’; then roughly the 1980s to the early 2000s, with networked personal 
computers entering offices and households; finally the last 15 years or so with 
‘smart’ phones and other ‘smart’ devices being used privately – for new purposes 
that emerge with the devices. 
This article is structured by two ideas, namely that a) technology drives ethics, 
and b) many issues that are now in ‘digital ethics’ predate digital technology. 
There is a certain tension between these two statements: The question is when 
‘technology drives ethics’ and when that ‘drive’ is specific to ‘digital’ (computing) 
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technology. Since we think that b) is true, we must start before the invention of 
digital technology; in fact, even before the invention of writing. 
We propose to divide the history into three main sections: pre-modernity (before 
the invention digital technology), modernity (with digital technology, but 
analogue lives), post-modernity (with digital technology and digital lives). We 
hope that this organisation matches the social developments of these periods, but 
we make no claim that the terminology used here is congruent with a standard 
history of digital society. In each section, we will briefly look at the technology, 
and then at digital ethics. Finally, it may be mentioned that there are significant 
research desiderata in the field; a detailed history of digital ethics, and indeed of 
applied or practical ethics, is yet to be written. 
2. Pre-Modernity: Talking and Writing 
2.1. Technology & Society 
A fair amount of the concerns of information ethics is about privacy, information 
security, power through information, etc. These issues existed well before the 
computing age. They do not even require that information is represented in 
symbolic form – they also feature in village gossip.  
One significant step for this timeline, however, were the beginnings of symbols 
and iconic representations from cave-paintings onwards (cf. Sassoon and Gaur 
1997). These allow to maintain records that do not immediately vanish, like 
speech does, and some of which can be transported to another place. It may be 
useful to differentiate (1) representation for someone, or intentional 
representation, and (2) representation per se, when something represents 
something else because that is its function in a system (assuming this is possible 
without intentional states). The word ’tree’, pronounced by someone, is an 
intentional representation (type 1); the non-linguistic representation of a tree in 
the brain of an organism that sees the tree is a non-intentional representation 
(type 2) (Mu ller 2007). Evidently, one major step that is relevant for digital ethics 
was the invention and use of writing – for the representation of natural language 
but also for mathematics and other purposes. Symbols in writing are digital, i.e. 
they have a sharp boundary with no intermediate stages (something is either an 
‘A’ or a ‘B’, it cannot be a bit of both) and they are perfectly reproducible, i.e. one 
can write the exact same word or sentence more than once. The replication of 
writing and images, in print, also multiplies the impact that goes with that writing 
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– what is printed can be transported, remembered, and read by many people. It 
can become part of the cultural heritage. 
A further major step is the transmission of speech and symbols over large 
distances and then to larger audiences through telegraph, mail, radio and TV. 
Suddenly, a single person speaking could be heard and even seen by millions of 
others around the globe, even in real time. 
2.2. Ethics 
There is a significant body of ethical and legal discussion on pre-digital 
information handling, especially after the invention of writing, printing and mass 
communication. Much of it is still the law today, such as the privacy of letters and 
other written communication, the press laws and laws on libel. The privacy of 
letters was legally protected in the early days of postal services in the early 18th 
Century, e.g. in the “Prussian New Postal Order” of 1712, (Matthias 1812: 54). 
Remarkably, several of these laws have lost their teeth in the digital era, e.g. email 
is often not protected by the privacy of letters, and online publications are often 
not covered by press law.  
The central issue of privacy, often connected with ‘data protection’ started around 
1900 (Warren and Brandeis 1890), developed into a field (Hoffman 1973; Martin 
1973; Westin 1968) and is still a central discussion today; from classical 
surveillance (Macnish 2017) governance (Bennett and Raab 2003) and ethical 
analysis (Roessler 2017; van den Hoven et al. 2020) to analysis for activism (Ve liz 
2020). The very close link between ethics and law, or indeed social science, has 
been somewhat lost since, and we are only recently re-establishing it, now that 
law must related to ethics, and ethics must relate to societal developments. The 
power of information and misinformation was well understood after the invention 
of printing, but especially after the invention of mass media like radio and TV and 
their use in propaganda – media studies and media ethics became standard fields 
after the Second World War. Media ethics is still an important aspect of digital 
ethics (Ess 2014), especially the aspect of the ‘public sphere’ (Habermas 1962). 
Apart from this tradition of more ‘societal’ ethics, there is a more personal ethics 
of professional responsibility that started in this area – and had impact in the digital 
era. The influential Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE, initially 
AIEE) adopted its first “Principles of professional conduct for the guidance of the 
electrical engineer” in 1912 (AIEE 1912). ‘Engineering Ethics’ is thus older than 
ethics of computing – but, interestingly, the electrical and telephone industries in 
the USA managed to get an exception to the demand that engineers hold a 
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professional license (PE). This move may have had far-reaching impact into the 
computer science of today, which usually does not see itself as a discipline of 
engineering, and bound by the ethos of engineers – though there are computer 
scientists that would want to achieve the recognition as a profession and thus the 
ethos of ‘being a good engineer’ (in many countries, engineering has high status 
and computer science degrees are ‘diplomas in engineering’). 
Up to this point, we see the main ethical themes of privacy and data security, 
power of information, and professional responsibility. 
3. Modernity: Digital ethics in IT 
3.1. Technology & Society 
As a rough starting point for this part of the timeline one should take the first 
design for a universal computer with Babbage’s ‘Analytic Engine’ in about 1840; 
the first actual universal computer was feasible only when computers could use 
electronic parts, starting with Zuse’s Z3 in 1941, followed by the independently 
developed ENIAC in 1945, and Manchester Mark I in 1949 and then many more 
machines, mostly due to military funding during (Ifrah 1981). All major computers 
since then have been electronic universal digital computers with stored program. 
Shortly after WWII, we have the beginnings of the science of ‘Informatics’ with 
‘Cybernetics’ (Ashby 1956; Wiener 1948) and C. E. Shannon’s “A Mathematical 
Theory of Communication” (Shannon 1948). In 1956, J. McCarthy, M. L. Minsky, N. 
Rochester and C. E. Shannon organised the Dartmouth conference on ‘Artificial 
Intelligence’, thus coining the term (McCarthy et al. 1955). Less than 10 years later, 
H. Simon predicts “Machines will be capable, within 20 years, of doing any work 
that a man can do.” (Simon 1965: 96). In 1971, integrated processor 
(microprocessor) computers started, with all integrated circuits in one microchip. 
This is effectively the modern computer area that made ‘personal computers’ 
possible in the 1980s. Up to that point, computers were big and very expensive 
devices, only used by large corporations, research centres or public entities for 
‘data processing’. 
Ray Kurzweil has put the development from WWII to the present with 
characteristic panache:  
Computers started out as large remote machines in air-conditioned rooms 
tended by white coated technicians. Subsequently they moved onto our desks, 
then under our arms, and now in our pockets. Soon, we’ll routinely put them 
inside our bodies and brains. Ultimately we will become more nonbiologial 
than biological. (Kurzweil 2002). 
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3.2. Ethics 
3.2.1. Professional ethics 
The first discussions about ethics and computers were about the ethics of the 
people who work professionally in computing – what they should or should not 
do. In that phase, a computer scientist was an expert, rather like a doctor or a 
mechanical engineer, and the question arose whether the new ‘profession’ needed 
an ethics. These early discussions of computer ethics often had a certain tinge of 
moralising, of having discovered an area of life that had escaped the attention of 
ethicists so far, but where immorality looms. In those days it is rare to find the 
more positive approach that practitioners face ethical problems that expert 
analysis might help to resolve; what one does find is the concern that a particular 
technology may have negative effects on society. This suspicion of immorality was 
often supported by the innocent view of practitioners that technology is neutral 
and our aims laudable, thus an ‘ethics of technology’ is not needed – a view one 
finds even today.  
The early attempts at a professional ethics moved into Computer Science pretty 
much at the beginning of the discipline, e.g. the US Association for Computing 
Machinery (ACM) adopted “Guidelines for Professional Conduct in Information 
Processing” on 11.11.1966 (Parker 1968), and Donn Parker pushed this agenda in 
his discipline in the ensuing years. The current version is called the “ACM Code of 
Ethics and Professional Conduct” (ACM 2018).  
3.2.2. Responsible technology 
The use of nuclear (atomic) bombs in the Second World War and the discussion 
about the risk of generating electricity in nuclear power stations (from the late 
1950s) fueled an increasing concern with the limits of technology in the 1960s. 
This political development is closely connected to the political developments in 
‘the generation of 1968’ on the political left in Europe and the United States. The 
‘Club of Rome’ was and is a group of high-level politicians, scientists, and industry-
leaders that deals with basic long-term problems of humankind. In 1972, it 
published the highly influential book The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of 
Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind (Club of Rome 1972). It argued that 
the industrialised world was on an unsustainable trajectory of economic growth, 
using up finite resources (e.g. oil, minerals, farmable land), and increasing 
pollution, on the background of an increasing world population.  
This book and other similar discussions fueled a generally more critical view of 
technology and the growth it enables. They lead to a field of ‘technology 
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assessment’ in terms of longer term impacts that has also dealt with information 
technologies (Grunwald 2002). This area of the social sciences is influential in 
political consulting and has some academic institutes (e.g. at the Karlsruhe 
Institute of Technology). At the same time, a more political angle of technology is 
taken in the field of ‘Science and Technology Studies’ (STS), which is now a sizable 
academic field with programs, journals, and conferences. As books like The Ethics 
of Invention (Jasanoff 2016) show, concerns in STS are often quite similar to those 
in ethics, though typically with a more ‘critical’ and more empirical approach. 
These STS approaches have remained oddly separate from ethics of computing. 
Concerns about sustainable development, especially ‘the environment’ have been 
prominent on the political agenda for about 40 years and they are now quite 
officially a central policy aim. In 2015, the UN adopted the “2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development” (United Nations 2015). Its 17 “Sustainable 
Development Goals” are now heavily influential, e.g. they guide the current 
development of official policy on AI. The 17 goals are, in brief: (1) No Poverty, (2) 
Zero Hunger, (3) Good Health and Well-being, (4) Quality Education, (5) Gender 
Equality, (6) Clean Water and Sanitation, (7) Affordable and Clean Energy, (8) 
Decent Work and Economic Growth, (9) Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure, 
(10) Reducing Inequality, (11) Sustainable Cities and Communities, (12) 
Responsible Consumption and Production, (13) Climate Action, (14) Life Below 
Water, (15) Life On Land, (16) Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions, (17) 
Partnerships for the Goals. 
3.2.3. Control 
It had also been understood by some that science and engineering, generally, pose 
ethical problems. The prominent physicist, C. F .v. Weizsa cker predicted in 1968 
that computer technology will fundamentally transform our lives in the coming 
decades (Weizsa cker 1968) and asked how we will have individual freedom in 
such a world, “i.e. freedom from the control of anonymous powers” (439). At the 
end of his article, he demands a Hippocratic oath for scientists. Soon after, in 1970, 
Weizsa cker became founding Director of the famous Max Planck Institute for 
Research into the Life in a Scientific-Technical World, co-directed by Ju rgen 
Habermas since 1971. Even at that time, there was clearly a sense with major state 
funders that these issues deserved their own research institute. 
The ACM already had a Special Interest Group ‘Computers & Society’ (SIGCAS) 
since 1969 – it is still a significant actor today and has published a 
newsletter/journal Computers and Society since 1972. 
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Norbert Wiener had warned of AI, even before the term was coined, e.g. in 
Cybernetics, he wrote:  
… we are already in a position to construct artificial machines of almost any 
degree of elaborateness of performance. Long before Nagasaki and the public 
awareness of the atomic bomb, it had occurred to me that we were here in the 
presence of another social potentiality of unheard-of importance for good and 
for evil. (Wiener 1948: 28).  
Note the link to the atomic bomb, a starting point for the critical view on 
technology. In his later book The Human Use of Human Beings he warns of 
manipulation:  
… such machines, though helpless by themselves, may be used by a human 
being or a block of human beings to increase their control over the rest of the 
race or that political leaders may attempt to control their populations by 
means not of machines themselves but through political techniques as narrow 
and indifferent to human possibility as if they had, in fact, been conceived 
mechanically. (Wiener 1950) 
For other aspects of Wiener’s ethics, see (Bynum 2008: 26-30; 2015). Thus, in this 
phase, professional responsibility gains prominence as an issue, the notion of 
control through information and machinery comes up as a theme, and there is a 
general concern about the longer-term impacts of technology – a concern that 
shapes much of politics today. 
4. Post-Modernity 
4.1. Technology & Society 
In this part of the quick timeline, from 1980 to today (2021), I will use a typical 
student in a wealthy country, like the United Kingdom, as an illustration. I think 
this timeline is useful because it is easy to forget how the availability and use of 
computers has changed in the last decades, and even the last years. (If this text is 
read a few years after writing, it will seem quaintly old-fashioned.) We will see 
that this is the phase in which computers enter peoples’ lives and digital ethics 
becomes a discipline. 
In the first half of the 1980s, a student would have seen a ‘personal computer’ (PC) 
in a business context, and towards the end of the 1980s they would probably own 
one. These PCs were not networked, unless on university premises, so data 
exchange was through floppy disks. Floppy disks held 360KB, later 720 KB and 
1.44 MB; if the PC had a hard drive at all, it would hold ca. 20-120 MB. After 1990, 
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if private PCs had network connections, that would be through modem dial-in on 
analogue telephone lines that would mainly serve links to others in the same 
network (e.g. CompuServe or AOL), allowing email and ftp (file-transfer protocol). 
Around the same time, PCs moved from a command-line to a graphic interface, e.g. 
MS Windows, Mac OS or UNIX. Students would use electrical typewriters or 
university-owned computers for their writing until well into the 1990s. The first 
WWW page came online in 1990; institutional web pages became common in the 
late 1990s; around the same time a dial-in Internet connection at home through a 
modem became affordable, and Google was founded (1998). After 2000, it became 
common for a student to have a computer at home, with an Internet connection, 
though file-exchanges would still be mostly via physical data-carriers. By ca. 2010 
the Internet connection would be ‘always on’ and fast enough for frequent use of 
www pages, and video; by ca. 2019 it would be fully digital (ISDN, ASDL, …) and 
its files would often be stored in ‘cloud’ spaces somewhere on the Internet; fibre-
optic lines started to be used around 2020. With the COVID pandemic 2020-21, 
cooperative work online through live video became common. 
Mobile phones (cell phones) became commonly affordable by students in the late 
1990s, but these were just phones, increasingly miniaturised. The first ‘smart’ 
phone, the iPhone, was introduced in 2007. Around 2015, a student would own 
such a smart phone and would use that phone mostly for things other than calls; 
essentially as a portable tablet computer with Wi-Fi capability (but it would be 
called a ‘phone’, not a ‘computer’). After 2015, the typical smart phone would be 
connected to the Internet at all times (with 3G). The frequent use of the WWW 
over phone Internet became affordable around 2018/19 (with 4G), at which time 
video calls and online teaching became possible and useful. 
Together with smartphones, we now (2021) also begin to have other ‘smart’ 
devices that incorporate computers and are connected to the Internet (soon with 
5G), especially portables, TVs, cars and homes – also known as the ‘Internet of 
Things’ (IoT). ‘Smart’ superstructures like grids, cities, and roads are developing 
as well. Sensors with digital output are becoming ubiquitous. In addition, a large 
part of our lives is digital (and thus does not need to be captured by sensors), and 
much of it conducted through commercial platforms and ‘social media’ systems. 
All these developments enable a surveillance economy. 
While a ‘computer’ was easily recognised as a physical box until ca. 2010, it is now 
incorporated in a host of devices and systems, and often not perceived as such; 
perhaps even designed not to be noticed (e.g. in order to collect data). Much of 
computing has become a transparent technology in our daily lives: We use it 
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without special learning, do not notice its existence, or that computing takes place: 
“The most profound technologies are those that disappear” (Weiser 1991: 94). 
For the purposes of digital ethics, the crucial developments of our student were 
the move from computers ‘somewhere else’ to her own PC (ca. 1990), the use of 
the WWW (ca. 1995) and her smartphone (ca. 2015); the current development is 
the move to computing as a ‘transparent technology’.  
4.2. Ethics 
4.2.1. Establishment 
The first phase of digital ethics, or computer ethics, was the effort in the 1980s and 
90s to establish that there is such a thing, or that there should be such a thing – 
both within philosophy or applied ethics, and within computer science, especially 
the curriculum of computer science at universities. This ‘establishment’ is of 
significant importance for the academic field, since, once ‘ethics’ is an established 
component of degrees in computer science and related disciplines, there is a 
labour market for academic teachers, a demand for writing textbooks and articles, 
etc. (Bynum 2010). It is not an accident that the field was established beyond 
‘professional ethics’ and general societal concerns around the same time as the 
move of computers from labs to offices and homes occurred. 
The first use of ‘computer ethics’ was probably by Deborah Johnson in her paper 
“Computer ethics: New study area for engineering science students”, where she 
remarked “Computer professionals are beginning to look toward codes of ethics 
and legislation to control the use of software” (Johnson 1978). Sometimes,  
(Bynum 2001) it is Walter Maner who credited with the first use for “ethical 
problems aggravated, transformed or created by computer technology” (Maner 
1980). Again, professional ethics seems to have been the forerunner for computer 
ethics, generally. 
A few years later, with fundamental publications like James H. [Jim] Moor’s “What 
is computer ethics?” (Moor 1985), the first textbook (Johnson 1985), and three 
anthologies with established publishers (Blackwell, MIT Press, Columbia UP) one 
can speak of an established small discipline (Moor and Bynum 2002). These two 
texts by Moor and Johnson are still the most cited works in the discipline, together 
with classic texts on privacy, such as (Warren and Brandeis 1890) and (Westin 
1968). As (Tavani 1999) shows, there is a steady flow of monographs, textbooks 
and anthologies in the 15 years that followed. In the 1990s, ‘ethics’ started to gain 
a place in many computer science curricula, thus generating demand for qualified 
faculty and for teaching material. 
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In terms of themes, we have the classical ones (privacy, information power, 
professional ethics, impact of technology) and we now have an increasing 
confidence that there is ‘something unique’ here. Maner says: “I have tried to show 
that there are issues and problems that are unique to computer ethics. For all of 
these issues, there was an essential involvement of computing technology. Except 
for this technology, these issues would not have arisen, or would not have arisen 
in their highly altered form.” (Maner 1996). 
In this vein, we now get a wider notion that includes issues that only come up in 
ethics of robotics and AI, e.g. manipulation, automated decision-making, 
transparency, bias, autonomous systems, existential risk, etc. (Mu ller 2020). More 
radically, digital ethics now covers the human digital life, online and with 
computing devices – both on an individual level and as a society, e.g. social 
networks (Vallor 2016). As a result, this handbook includes themes like human-
robot interaction, online interaction, fake news, online relationships, advisory 
systems, transparency & explainability, discrimination, nudging, cybersecurity, 
and existential risk – in other words, the digital life is prominently discussed here; 
something that would not have happened even five years ago. 
4.2.2. Institutional 
The journal Metaphilosophy first published articles on computer ethics in the mid-
1980s; T.W. Bynum and R. Reese had founded it in 1970. The more prominent 
journal Minds and Machines, founded by James Fetzer 1991, started publishing 
ethics papers under the editorship of James H. Moor (2001-10). The conferences 
series ETHICOMP (1995) and CEPE (1997) started in Europe, and specialised 
journals were established: Journal of Information Ethics (1992), Science and 
Engineering Ethics (1995), Ethics and Information Technology (1999), Philosophy 
& Technology (2010). The conferences on ‘Computing and Philosophy’ (CAP), since 
1986 in North America, later in Europe and Asia, united to IACAP in 2011, 
increasingly have a strong division on ethical issues; as does the AISB (in the UK). 
Within the academic field of philosophy, applied ethics and digital ethics have 
remained firmly marginal or specialist even now, with very few presentations at 
mainstream conferences, publications in mainstream journals, or posts at 
mainstream departments. As far as I can tell, no paper on digital ethics has 
appeared in places like The Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Philosophical Review, 
Philosophy & Public Affairs or Ethics to this day – while, significantly, there are 
papers in Science, Nature or Artificial Intelligence. Practically oriented fields are 
treated largely as the poor and slightly embarrassing cousin who has to work for 
a living, rather than having old money in the bank. What counts as ‘a problem’ is 
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still mostly defined through the tradition of philosophy, rather than permitting a 
problem to enter philosophy from the outside life. It is only very recently that 
some in these ‘practical’ fields have the ambition to have a real influence in 
traditional philosophy, and I would venture that this influence will be strong in 
the decades to come. It is interesting to note that the citation counts of academics 
in computing ethics and theory have surpassed those of comparable philosophers 
in related traditional areas, and similar trends are happening now with journals. 
One data point: As of 2019, the average article in Mind is cited 2 times within 4 
years, while the average article in Minds and Machines is cited 3 times within 4 
years – the number for the latter journal doubled in 3 years 
(https://www.scimagojr.com). 
Several prominent philosophers have worked on theoretical issues around AI and 
computing (e.g. Dennett, Dreyfus, Fodor, Haugeland, Searle), given the more 
mainstream attachment to ‘philosophy of cognitive science’ and ‘philosophy of 
mind’ – and typically with a foundation of their careers in other areas of 
philosophy. This also applies to Jim Moor, who was one of the first people in digital 
ethics to hold a professorship at a reputed general university (Dartmouth College). 
In Europe, several technical universities had professors working in digital ethics 
early on, notably the TUs in the Netherlands, who founded a 4TU Centre for Ethics 
and Technology in 2007, joining Delft, Eindhoven, Twente and Wageningen. In the 
last decade, Floridi and Bostrom were appointed to professorships at Oxford, at 
the OII and FHI institutes. Coeckelbergh was appointed to a chair at the philosophy 
department in Vienna in 2015 (where Hrachovec had been active already). A few 
more people were and are active in philosophical issues of ‘new media’, e.g. Ch. 
Ess who moved to Oslo in 2012. The ethics of AI became a field only quite recently, 
with the first conference in 2012 (AGI-Impacts), but it now has its own institutes 
at many mainstream universities. 
In other words, only five years ago, almost all scholars in digital ethics were at 
marginal institutions to mainstream philosophy. It is only in those last couple of 
years that digital ethics is becoming mainstream; many more jobs are advertised, 
senior positions are available to people in the field, younger faculty are picking up, 
and more established faculty at established institutions begin to deem these 
matters worthy of their attention.  
We expect that mainstream philosophy will quickly pick up digital ethics in the 
coming years – the subject has shown itself to be mature, fruitful for classical 
philosophical issues, there is an obvious societal demand, and there are significant 
funding opportunities. Probably there is also some hype already. In the classic 
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notion of a ‘hype cycle’ for the expectations from a new technology, the 
development is supposed to go through several phases: After its beginnings at the 
‘Technology Trigger’, it gains more and more attention, reaching a ‘Peak of Inflated 
Expectations’, after that a more critical evaluation begins and the expectations go 
down, reaching a ‘Trough of Disillusionment’. From there, a realistic evaluation 
shows that there is some use, so we get the ‘Slope of Enlightenment’ and 
eventually the technology settles on a ‘Plateau of Productivity’ and becomes 
mainstream. The Gartner Hype Cycle for AI, 2019 (Goasduff 2019) sees digital ethics 
itself at the ‘peak of inflated expectations’ … meaning it is downhill from here, for 
some time, until we hopefully reach the ‘plateau of productivity’. (My own view is 
that this is wrong, since we see the beginnings of AI policy and stronger digital 
ethics now.) 
4.2.3. Future 
The state of the art at the present and an outlook into the future are given in the 
chapters of this handbook. Moor saw a bright future 20 years ago already: “The 
future of computer ethics: You ain’t seen nothin’ yet!” (Moor 2001), and he 
followed up with a programmatic plea for ‘machine ethics’ (Moor 2006). Moor 
opens his article with the bold statement: 
Computer ethics is a growth area. My prediction is that ethical problems 
generated by computers and information technology in general will abound 
for the foreseeable future. Moreover, we will continue to regard these issues 
as problems of computer ethics even though the ubiquitous computing 
devices themselves may tend to disappear into our clothing, our walls, our 
vehicles, our appliances, and ourselves. (Moor 2001: 89) 
This prediction has undoubtedly held up until now. The ethics of the design and 
use of computers is clearly an area of very high societal importance and we would 
do well to catch problems early on – this is something we failed to do in the area 
of privacy (Ve liz 2020) and some hope that we will do in the area of AI (Mu ller 
2020). 
However, as Moor mentions, there is also a very different possible line that was 
developed around the same time: Bynum reports on an unpublished talk by 
Deborah G. Johnson with the title “Computer Ethics in the 21st Century”, at the 
1999 ETHICOMP conference: 
On Johnson’s view, as information technology becomes very commonplace – 
as it gets integrated and absorbed into our everyday surroundings and is 
perceived simply as an aspect of ordinary life – we may no longer notice its 
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presence. At that point, we would no longer need a term like ‘computer ethics’ 
to single out a subset of ethical issues arising from the use of information 
technology. Computer technology would be absorbed into the fabric of life, 
and computer ethics would thus be effectively absorbed into ordinary ethics. 
(Bynum 2001: 111f) (cf. Johnson 2004) 
On Johnson’s view, we will have applied ethics and the ethics will concern most 
themes, such as ‘information privacy’ or ‘how to behave in a romantic relationship’ 
– and much of this will be taking places with or through computing devices, but it 
will not matter (even though many things will remain that cannot be done without 
such devices). In other words, the ‘drive’ of technology we have seen in this history 
will come to a close, and the technology will become transparent. This 
transparency will likely have ethical problems itself – it enables surveillance and 
manipulation. If Johnson is right, however, we will soon have the situation that all 
too much is digital and transparent, and thus digital ethics is in danger of 
disappearing. In Molie re’s play, this bourgeois who wants to become a gentleman 
tells his ‘philosophy master’: 
“Oh dear! For more than forty years I have been 
speaking prose while knowing nothing of it, and I 
am most obliged to you for telling me so.” 
Molie re, Le Bourgeois gentilhomme (Act II) 1670 
5. Conclusion, questions 
One feature that is characteristic of the new developments in digital ethics, and in 
applied philosophy, generally, is how a problem becomes a problem worth 
investigating. In traditional philosophy, the criterion is often that there is already 
a discussion in the tradition and that there is something philosophically 
interesting about it, something unresolved – and typically we do not need to ask 
again whether that problem is really worth discussing, or whether it perhaps 
relies on assumptions we should not make (so we will get people who seriously 
ask whether Leibniz or Locke was right on the origin of ideas, for example). In 
digital ethics, what counts as a problem also includes the demand to 
philosophically interesting, but more importantly, whether it has relevance. Quite 
often this means that the problem first surfaces in fields other than philosophy. 
The initially dominant approach of professional ethics had a touch of ‘policing’ 
about it, of checking that everyone behaves - that moralising gives ethics a bad 
name and it typically comes too late. More modern digital ethics tries to make 
people sensitive in the design process (‘ethics by design’) and to pick up problems 
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where people really do not know what the ethically right thing to do is – these are 
the proper ethical problems that deserve our attention. 
For the relation of ethics and computer ethics, Moor seemed right in this 
prediction: 
The development of ethical theory in computer ethics is sometimes 
overstated and sometimes understated. The overstatement suggests that 
computer ethics will produce a new ethical theory quite apart from traditional 
ethical notions. The understatement suggests that computer ethics will 
disappear into ordinary ethics. The truth, I predict, will be found in the middle. 
[…] My prediction is that ethical theory in the future will be recognizable but 
reconfigured because of work done in computer ethics during the coming 
century. (Moor 2001: 91) 
As philosophers, we must do more than export an expertise from philosophy or 
ethics to practical problems, we must also import insights from these debates back 
to philosophy. The discipline can feed largely on the societal demand and the real 
impact philosophical insights can have in this area, but in order to secure its place 
within philosophy, we must show that the work is both technically serious and has 
real potential to shed light on traditional issues. It seems obvious that this is the 
case. Consider the question of when an artificial agent truly is an agent that is 
responsible for their actions – that discussion seems to provide a new angle to 
these debates that traditionally focused on human beings or animals. Now we can 
set the conceptual question anew and also provide evidence from experiments 
with making things, rather than from passive observation. 
Nearly 250 years ago, Immanuel Kant stated that our philosophical reasoning is 
about four main questions: “1. What can I know? 2. What should I do? 3. What can 
I hope for? 4. What is the human?” (Kant 1800: 26), (1-3 already in Kant 1781: A805 




I am grateful for useful comments to Guido Lo hr, Karsten Weber and Eleftheria 
Deltsou, and for detailed reviewing to Carissa Ve liz, Maximilian Karge and Jeff 
White. 
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